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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
]<;Irnl<~~TINE

B. HARRISON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

.JACK

~1.

HARRISON,

Case No.
11370

Defendant a11d Appella.nt.

Respondent's Brief on Appeal
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
'l'hi8 was an action by plaintiff to alter and amend
the prnYisions of a Divorce Decree. The motion of plaintiff was based upon a fraud committed by defendant
upon the Uonrt, or in the alternative, was based upon a
sub::;tautial change of circumstances of the parties since
the time of the diYorce (R-98). In addition, plaintiff
~oug-ht judgment for arrearages under the original De('J'Pt> (R-104). In addition, plaintiff had caused to be is~m'(l a Writ of Garnishment upon Valley Bank & Trust
( 'onqiany under an existing judgment (R-109). Defendant elaimcd that the garnishment was improper because
it had been levied against partnership funds; this mat1(•1· \\'H8 abo before the Court and disposed of at the
l1t«1 ring.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO-WER COUR'l'
The case was tried on June 19, 1968, in the DiRtriet
Court of Salt Lake County before the Honorable J osei1l!
G. Jeppson, District Judge. The Court found that defendant had misrepresented his income at the time nf
the original divorce hearing in December of 1966; had
concealed a certain bank account in the sum of Nine
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars And
No/100 ($9,729.00); was delinquent under the Decree:
and that the garnishment against Valley Bank & Trust
Company was proper (R-114). The following relief \ms
granted to plaintiff:
(a) Child support was increased from Three
Hundred Dollars ($300.00) to Four Hundred
Dollars ($400.00) per month.
(b) Alimony was increased from Seventy-Fiw
Dollars ($75.00) per month to Five Hunclrerl
Dollars ($500.00) per month.
(c) An equity in a home at 1670 Merribee Wa.1-,
Salt Lake City, which had previously been
awarded one-half to the defendant was
awarded to plaintiff ..
(d) Plaintiff was awarded judgment for Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Four Dollars
And 50/100 ($4,864.50) together with interest, representing one-half of the concealed
bank account.

(e) Plaintiff was awarded judgment for Three
Hundred, Seventy-Five Dollars ($3/fi.OO)
representing unpaid alimony and child support for the month of June, 1968.
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(f) Plaintiff was awarded Four Hundred Twenty
Dollars ($420.00) representing the unpaid
amount of an obligation at American Savings
& Loan Association which defendant had been
ordered to pay under the terms of the original Decree.
(g) Plaintiff was awarded One Thousand Dollars
($1,000.00) attorney's fees plus costs.
(h) Defendant was ordered to pay to Kenneth
Rigtrup, plaintiff's former attorney, any
amounts earned in the divorce case in excess
of the amount previously awarded. No definite amount was awarded, however, and this
·was left for determination by the Court in
the future.
( i) 'l111e Court found that there was a balance of

One Thousand Seventy-Five Dollars ($1,075.00) plus costs of the prior action due
plaintiff under a prior judgment; determined
that the Writ of Garnishment against Valley
Bank & Trust Company was proper; and
awarded a garnishee judgment against Valley
Bank & Trust Company for the Eleven Hundred Seventy Two Dollars And 40/100 ($1,172.40), being the amount due.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks that the judgment of the trial court
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, in his brief, has made a lengthy statement of facts but has omitted to mention the numerous
facts and evidence which support the findings and judg3

ment of the trial court. For this reason, plaintiff dP.~iri·.•
to make her own statement of those facts relevant to (J 11 ,
appeal.
Plaintiff and defendant were married J nne 26, rn:ii
(R-67) and divorced on March 10, 1967, (R-80). 'rlirn·
were five ( 5) children born as issue of the marriBgp
(R-67). The original divorce hearing was heard in R
contested hearing before the Honorable Aldon J. Andl'tson on November 22, 1966, and after several continuances, was heard to conclusion on December 13, 196G
(R-66). At the conclusion of the divorce trial, the Court
found that the defendant had treated plaintiff eruell)·,
causing her great mental and physical strain and emotional distress, particularly by reason of his association
with one, Lorraine Woodland (R-67). The Court thcll
granted plaintiff a divorce, granted plaintiff alimony ot
Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, granted plaintiff child support of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00)
per month, provided for visitation of the childrrn, aml
made a division and distribution of the property of tlw
parties (R-75). The particular finding upon which the
provisions of the Decree relating to alimony, ebild support and property distribution were based is :F'in<ling
No. 6 (R-68) which provides as follows:
"Defendant is self-employed, being a partner in
Jack M. Harrison & Associates, a data processing
and accounting systems business, and has a ml
income of approximately Six Hundred Dollnr'
( $600.00) per month.''
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1

lt is thl' above finding that plaintiff attacks in this pro-

c1·rcli11g as being entirely untrue and being based upon
tl1e concealment and the false and fraudulent testimony
11f the clcfendant. The defendant, Jack M. Harrison, acknowleclgcd that he had testified in the divorce trial
c1mcerning his income, and that he did not think there
11as auy other testimony at the trial concerning his income other than his own (R-155).
Plaintiff demonstrated in this proceeding by clear
and c011\'incing evidence that the Jack M. Harrison &
/u;;sociates alleged partnership was not a bona fide part1wrship at all, but had been set up prior to the divorce
haring as a device to conceal income. Plaintiff further
clemonstra ted that defendant's income was greatly in excess of the amount represented to the Court and, further,
that it has substantially increased since the time of the
trial.
A.

Facts Demonstrating the Fra·udulent N afore of the
Partnership

Rvidence produced by the plaintiff to show the
framlulent nature of the partnership was as follows:
1. The partnership agreement was executed at appr"ximately the same time as the divorce action. The
l'P<·ord 011 appeal does not show the original divorce
( 'i!mplaint; however, the Amended Complaint was filed
,June ~. 1966, (R-6). The partnership agreement was
made Oll April 15, 1966 (Exhibit P-2).
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2. Prior to the formation of the partnership, tlie
defendant operated the same business at the same loca.
tion as an individual proprietorship (R-158). He had
been in business at the same location for about three and
one-half years prior to the date of trial (R-158).
3. The defendant testified that at the time of the
divorce trial, the partners in the business were himself,
his stepfather, Hoyt Pope, and his brother, Dwayne Harrison (R-156); that at the time of the hearing herein,
the partners were himself, his mother and his stepfather
(R-156).
4. The defendant further testified that Dwayue
Harrison never made any capital contributions to the
partnership (R-161). Also, his stepfather, Hoyt Pope,
never made any capital contributions, except that Yery
recently, he made a capital contribution of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) and then withdrew Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) (R-159, 161).
5. The only person who made capital contributions

to the partnership was the defendant. These contrilrn-

tions consisted of all of the physical assets, accounts receivable, and accounts payable of his existing business.
Thereafter, the business continued doing business in the
same manner as it had before (R-158).
6. The defendant's stepfather, Hoyt Pope, whom he
claims to be a partner, is a resident of Longmont, Colorado, and has never resided in Utah since the partnership
was formed. The partnership has done no business in
Colorado (R-159).
6

7. 'rhe defendant's stepfather, Hoyt Pope, is a
ii c·lcler by trade. He has no background in data processi11g. He has not graduated from high school (R-297).
8. Dwayne Harrison, whom the defendant claimed
to be a partner at the time of the divorce hearing, never
rn::Hle any capital contributions to the partnership
(R-161). The defendant did not recognize Dwayne as
being a partner at the time of the hearing to amend the
Dreree (R-162, 218). Dwayne worked in the business
during the year 1967, but has since been replaced by a
Fiw Hundred Dollar ($500.00) per month female employee ( H.-255).

9. In June of 1967, the defendant made an application to Valley Bank & Trust Company for a loan to :finance the construction of a commercial building. On the
Ir.au application, he listed himself as "owner" of Jack
~I. Harrison Associates (Exhibit P-12). On this exhibit,
he also listed himself as being the applicant for the loan.
The defendant further acknowledged in his testimony
that the information on the application was correct
(R-210).
10. The defendant was requested to furnish a Profit
and Loss Statement for the year 1966 at the time he
made an application for the loan at Valley Bank & Trust
Company. Such a statement was furnished, and the
~ame showed the net income from Harrison & Associates
for the year 1966 to be Eighteen Thousand Seventy-Six
f>ol!ani And 67 /100 ($18,076.67) (Exhibit P-10). This
1
.·xad amount of Eighteen Thousand Seventy-Six Dollars
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And 67/100 ($18,076.67) was shown on the defenda 11 r,
1966 personal tax return as income received from part.
nerships (Exhibit P-11). A partnership tax return ,1·a~
filed for 1966 showing a partnership income of flp1·ei1
Thousand Sixty-Three Dollars And 04/100 ($7,063.0-±)
(Exhibit P-23). This does not include the salary paid
to the defendant. The entire profit from the partnership
was shown on Schedule K of the partnership return to
have been taken by the defendant. The other partnrn
as listed did not receive credit for any of the partnernhip
income. The tax returns for the year 1966 were prepRrrd
and dated prior to the time plaintiff filed her action to
alter and amend the Divorce Decree.

11. Tax returns for the year 1967 were prepared
by the defendants after this action was filed and after
depositions were taken herein (Exhibits P-3 and P-4:
R-168). In the partnership return, almost all of the
ordinary income was credited to the defendant's stepfather. The entire amount credited to him, howcvrr, has
remained undistributed (R-199).
12. Almost all of the defendant's personal expense>
are charged to the partnership and charged off as a lm'iness expense. Facts demonstrating this in detail arr
set forth and documented beginning at page 12, supra.
13. The defendant's former attorney, John Elwood
Dennett, was called by plaintiff as a witness in the ea 11 ~
and testified as to conversations he had with the <lefendant following the time he lm;t his license to practice
law. In these conversations, Jack Harrison stated tlrnl

8

]w

Jiatl a "paper partnership" and that it was set up

i11 the mitk1h~ of a divorce action because, "I didn't want

to he ahlc• to get into my assets." (R-271, 272). He
iurtl1er testifie<1 that the defendant said the partnership
[;d1·r <1r,·t>lopc<1 into a real partnership between himself
n11d D1\l1yn0, hut that his stepfather, :\Ir. Pope, was al1nt.' s n pa1ier partner from the time the partnership was
nL'<tl('d (H-272).
ltL'l'

14. j\l r. Byron Stnhhs, an attorney at law and memlin of tile Utah State Bar, testified concerning conversalion.s that took place at a meeting ·which he attended
;111d 1rhil'h took place on February 12, 1968. T\Ir. Stubbs
1ras repn•sc'nting Dwayne Harrison at the meeting. Presf'llt at th<• meeting were Jack Harrison, his stepfather,
~fr. Pope, !tis mother and Jerry Hansen, attorney at law,
il'Jll'rse11ting .Tack Harrison (R-287). 1\Ir. Stubbs testili1"<1 that .Tack Harrison told him in substance that
Jh, a~·11p !tad no interest in the partnership (R-287).
Jack further atkised him as follows:
"Jack informed me that the partnership, which
l >wayne furnished me \\·ith a copy of the partnership agre0ment, was merely a paper partnership,
and :\Ir. Pope indicated to me that it was a paper
partiwrship; in response to a question, I asked
l1im if he c•ver had put $2,000.00 into the partner·"'lii p; he indicated, no, he had not, and the only
otlH'r -- the real interest in the conversation was
that Jack told me that Dwayne had been in some
t rouhle in Dc1wer, and that .Jack had bailed him
on t, a ncl e1·e11 had to pay Dwayne's way to Salt
Like City to heconw an employee." (R-288)

9

15. The defendant testified that he has no personal
checking account and that all of his personal expense,
are handled on a company check (R-194).
16. The defendant further testified that he is the
only person authorized to sign company checks (R-163).
The so-called partnership bank account is set up in the
name of ''Jack Harrison doing business as Harrison &
Associates" (R-257).

B.

Facts Demonstrating the Income of the Defcnrlant

There was some conflicting evidence concerning the
income of the defendant. The evidence consisted as follows:
The defendant's loan application to Valley Bank &
Trust Company filed in June of 1967 stated his income
to be Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) per year
(Exhibit P-12).
The Profit and Loss Statement for the year 1966
furnished to Valley Bank & Trust Company showed an
income of Eighteen Thousand Seventy-Six Dollars Anrl
67 /100 ($18,076.67) (Exhibit P-10).
The defendant claimed on his 1966 personal tax return, income from partnerships in the amount of Eigl1teen Thousand Seventy-Six Dollars And 67 /100 ($18,076.67) (Exhibit P-11). This return shows a claimed loss
from the sale of stock which the def end ant testified wa~
disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service.
10

A Profit and Loss Statement furnished by the defendant to Valley Bank & Trust Company for the period,
,January 1, 1967, through May 31, 1967, showed a net
profit of Twenty One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty One
Dollars And 88/100 ($21,681.88) for that period of time
(~Jxhibit P-9).
The defendant testified that the income from the
hnsiness for the year 1967 was either Thirty Six Thousand Dollars ($36,000.00) or Thirty Five Thousand Dollarn ($35,000.00) (R-168, 207).
The defendant told John Elwood Dennett, his former
attorney, that he had a gross income in 1966 of over
~ orty Five Thousand Dollars ($45,000.00) and that he
was able to net two-thirds of the gross as net income
for the year 1966 (R-266). He further told Dennett that
l11s ~roRs for 1967 was Ninety Six Thousand Dollars
(~96,000.00) and that his expenses were a lesser perl'entage than the year before (R-268). He stated that his
net for 1967 would be just a little under Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00) and asked Mr. Dennett to suggP8t ways of escaping taxes (R-268). The defendant
fnrther stated that he expected to double his income in
19G8, although this statement was made at a time after
c·ertain hostilities had developed (R-269).
1

if the Court were to entirely disregard the
btimony of Mr. Dennett and accept the statement of
lli(• cldendant that the income from the partnership for
1~!1)/ was Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00),
111P PYi<lPnce clearly demonstrates that such figure is a
l~ven
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starting point only. The Thirty Five Thousand Dol!m.'
($35,000.00) was arrived at by taking the net profit fur
1967 as shown on the tax return and adding the paymPnt~
to partners (R-207). However, in arriving at tlw uet
profit, there were numerous items claimed as busiuess
expense which actually represented personal expenditures of the defendant. An example of these are a'
follows:
(a) The defendant admitted that all of the n1lvertising and promotion expense ·was rontecl
through his pocket. All of the checks clrnrgeil
to advertising and promotion were made p~ir
able to Valley Bank & Trust Company; tlie
procedure was for the defendant to cash these
checks and then use the cash as he sa11- fit.
This amounted to the sum of Seventeen Hundred Thirty Three Dollars ( $1,733.00) in 196i
(R-173).
(b) All of the defendant's gas and oil expenditures are charged off as a business expense.
The business owned a 1962 Cadillac, a cam1wr
and a 1956 Chevrolet. The automobiles wm
operated by the defendant, although the 19ii6
Chevrolet was not used last year. 'l'he 1lcfendant considered these auto~obiles as business cars· these expenses amounted to Fourteen Hundred Nineteen Dollars AnJ 54/lOU
($1,419.54) in 1967. (R-174; also Exhibit P-fl,
page 2).
'

l

(c) All repairs to the automobiles are charged H'
a business expense. These expenses amounted to Six Hundred Forty One Dollars Antl
14/100 ($641.14) in 1967. (R-175; also Exhibit P-6, pagP 2).
12

(d) Insurance, including all of the defendant's
car insurance is charged as business expense.
'l'his amounted to Seven Hundred Sixty
Three Dollars And 93/100 ($763.93) in 1967.
(R-176; also Exhibit P-6, page 3).
( e) A substantial portion of the rent on the defendant's personal apartment was charged
as a business expense. The amount so expensed was Seven Hundred Twenty Dollars
($720.00) in 1967. (R-177; also Exhibit P-6,
page 4, note entries showing checks payable
to Twin Palms Apartments).
(f) The defendant testified that a portion of his
power and telephone bills were charged as
business expense (R-80). Exhibit P-6 is a
general ledger for the business for the year
1967. Account No. 950 was the defendant,
Jack M. Harrison's personal drawing account. The defendant testified that the portion of his utilities charged to him personally should appear under Account No. 950
(R-181). An examination of Account No. 950
shows no payments to any utility companies
(Exhibit P-6, page 14). Thus all of the defendant's utilities were charged to the company as a business expense, although it cannot be determined from the ledger the exact
amount attributable to defendant personally
(Exhibit P-6, page 10).
(g) Account No. 274 (Exhibit P-6, page 7) which
is contract labor (R-178) shows payments of
Seven Hundred Seventy Four Dollars And
50 /100 ( $77 4.50) to Lorraine Woodland.
This is the same Lorraine Woodland ref erred
to in the Findings of Fact of the original
divorce action as being the person with whom
defendant ~was keeping company (R-179).
13

(h) During the year 1967, the company purclrnH.,
the truck and camper from Hincklcr\; at 8
cost of Four Thousand Sc\-en Hundred Did.
la rs ( $4,700.00). This was purchas<:>d witli
company funds and is being depreciateJ a'
a b~siness expense. The defendant claim,
that this was purchased as a delivery truck,
although the camper is permanently mou11tc·rl
and has never been off the truck. Also, tlwri·
is no sign on the truck indicating it to lw a
company truck, and the only items ev<:>r tie.
livered anywhere are paper supplies. (R-183
to 185, 205).
1

The above all represent items which plaintiff was
able to uncover in the hearing. There are numerou~
items in the general ledger posted in such accounts a~
"Cost of Goods Sold,'' "Labor,'' and "Contract Labor"
which plaintiff had no way of determining whether they
are legitimate.
In addition to the a hove, there are other indication'
from the evidence that the income from the business i'
more than was admitted by the defendant. Dming the
year 1967, the business paid approximately Thirty Fiw
Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) in cash tmvarcls a new
building. This amount \Vas in addition to the Twenty
Seven Thousand Dollars ($27,000.00) borrowed from
Valley Bank & Trust Company. The cost of the hnildingwas Fifty Three Thousand Dollars ($53,000.00) (R.-204).
This did not include the land cost of Four Thousand F'ire
Hundred Dollars ( $4,500.00) ( R-204). The net amount
disbursed by Valley Bank & Trust Company under the
loan was Twenty Four Thousand Six Hundred Fort:·
14

Tlm•o Dollars And 27/100 ($24,643.27) (R-211). There
\\l'I'e 110 other loans made to finance the building (R-213).
:\o additional amounts are owing (R-215). The loan at
Ynllry Bank & Trust Company is being paid off over a
ten (10) year period of time and is not delinquent (R-210,
313 ). The building was constructed during the summer
of 1D67 ( R-205). The building has been appraised at
Sixty T>vo Thousand Dollars ($62,000.00) (R-215).
In addition to the large cash payments made on the
l1nilding during 1967, the defendant made loans during
1967 of almost Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) (R-181;
also Exhihit P-6, page 11). One of the entries shows a
loan to Lorraine Woodland, his girlfriend, in the amount
of Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($2,~50.00).

('. Facts Demonstrating That the Income of Defendant
lias not dropped in 1968

rrhe defendant testified generally that his income
1rns down and his expenses were up for the year 1968.
:\o records were produced for the year 1968, and the defrnuant testified that none were available (R-215, 216).
'l'he plaintiff called an officer of Valley Bank & Trust
l'ompany to testify concerning the gross bank deposits
in tlir company's checking account for 1968. The records
from the bank indicated that the deposits from January
l 1hrnu~h May of 1968 were Forty Nine Thousand
Thi rty-Ij'our Dollars And 93 /100 ( $49,034.93). This is
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more than one-half of what defendant ackno-wleclged to
be his gross receipts in 1967 ($96,116.39; R-164), vet
covers a period of only five ( 5) months.
The defendant also told his former attorney, Jlr.
Dennett, that he expected to double the business in 1%8
(R-270).

D.

Facts Demonstrating That the Def end ant Concea/erl
a Bank Account at the Time of the Original Dirorr1
Action

Plaintiff introduced evidence showing the manipulation of various savings accounts at J\Iurray First Thrift
& Loan Company. Exhibit P-15 shows an account arnl
ledger sheet sho-wing a savings account in the name of
Jack l\L Harrison in the amount of Three Thousarnl
Ninety Four Dollars And 19/100 ( $3,094.19). This entire account was withdrawn on August 18, 1966. 'fhis
was three months prior to the time the trial was held in
the divorce case. On the same day, August 18, 1966, a
new account was opened at ::\forray First Thrift in the
name of Jack M. Harrison & Associates (Exhibit P-16).
The initial deposit was Four Thousand Five Hunclrerl
Ninety Four Dollars And 19/100 ( $4,594.19), and other
deposits were later added. On November 28, 1966, a
withdrawal was posted to the ledger of this account. The
amount of the withdrawal was Nine Thousand Seven
Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars ($9,729.00), which ro11sisted of all of the money in the account.

16

The above withdrawal of Nine Thousand Seven
Hurnlrud rrwenty Nine Dollars ($9,729.00) was comparl'cl to a new account in the name of Keith C.
Hawkes which was opened at J\Iurray First Thrift on
\'rwembcr 22, 1966 (Exhibit P-18). The date that the
KL'ith C. IIa·wkes account was opened was the very day
ilwt the Ji,Torce trial started. The amount of the initial
1kposit in the Keith C. Hawkes account correlated exartly to the amount withdrawn from the account of Jack
~l. Harrison & Associates which was Nine Thousand
Sen'n Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars ($9,729.00).
On .July 3, 1967, after the divorce trial was over, the
Keith Hawkes account was closed with a withdrawal of
Tcn Thousand Fifty Two Dollars And 32/100 ($10,05~.~2) (Exhibit P-18). There had been no additional
Jeposib; to this account other than interest entries.
In the meantime, another account had been opened
al :\forray First Thrift in the name of Harrison & Assoeiatrs (11~xhiLit P-17). On the very day that Keith
Ha\Ykes closed his account (July 3, 1967), a deposit was
made to the Harrison & Associates account in the amount
of 'I'm Thousand One Hundred Twenty One Dollars And
91/100 ($10,121.91).
KPith C. Hawkes was called as a witness by the
plaiHtiff. He admitted that he had received the money
froru .J a Pk Harrison, but claimed it was a loan to purd1ast> a restaurant in Jackson, Wyoming (R-187). He
stalc,d that the money was never withdrawn from Murray First 'fhrift because the restaurant deal fell through
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(R-188). There was no written instrument or note ewr
made up, and the note was strictly oral (R-189). No in.
terest was ever paid other than the interest that had ac.
crued at Murray First Thrift (R-190).
The plaintiff, Mrs. Harrison, testified that she had
no knowledge of the account of Jack M. Harrison & As.
sociates in the amount of Nine Thousand Seven Hundred
Twenty Nine Dollars ($9,729.00) that existed on the day
the divorce trial commenced. (R-282). She did not learn
of this account until "yesterday." R-182).
The Findings of Fact in the original divorce actio11
listed in detail all of the assets of the parties. The findings refer to family savings of Sixteen Hundred Dollars
(R-68) of which plaintiff was awarded the sum of Eight
Hundred Dollars ($800.00) (R-71, 78).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT WERE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Plaintiff's Motion to Alter and Amend the Judgment
was made on the ground of fraud committed upon the
Court, or in the alternative, upon a substantial change
of circumstances. The trial court made a finding of both
fraud and change of circumstances (R-115). The eYi·
dence supports both findings, either of which would sup·
port the judgment of the trial court.
18

As to the change of circumstances, the evidence of
1Mendant 's income in 1967 and 1968 as set forth in detail
in the statement of facts herein clearly shows that he is
making substantially more than the Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month which the Court found to be
Iii~ income at the time of the original divorce action.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code An.notated, 1953 provides that
"subse(1uent changes or new orders may be made by the
Court with respect to the disposal of children or the
distribution of property as shall be reasonable and proper." This Court has recently reaffirmed that under the
ahore statute, the Court retains jurisdiction of the parties to modify the decree with respect to the distribution of property, especially where the parties voluntarily
litigate a matter over which the Court has jurisdiction.
lMt -vs- Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329 437 P. 2d 684. The controlling principle has been stated that a decree of dirnrce may be modified if it is alleged, proved, and the
trial court finds that the circumstances upon which it
ll'as based have undergone a substantial change. Gale
-1·s- Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P. 2d 986; Osmus -vs- Osmu.s,
114 Utah 216, 198 P. 2d 233. This Court has also held
that the modification of a decree is within the latitude of
disrretion reposed in the trial court with respect to
which his judgment should not be interfered with unless
thPre is shown some injustice or inequity as to indicate
a clear abuse of that discretion. Jorgensen -vs- Jorgense11, 17 Utah 2d 159, 406 P.2d 304.
As to the fraud, the leading Utah case appears to
hP lfonrr -rs- Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d 577. There
liJp Court stated as follows:
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"It is sometimes said that when a judgmc 111
is attacked collaterally on the ground that it \\'a,
obtained by fraud or deceit it will be set asid,,
only for extrinsic fraud. But we are in a~cord
with the indications in the Restatement of Juck
ments that this is too limited. It seems more r~<;I
istic to say that when it appears that the processes of justice have been so completely thwarted
or distorted as to persuade the court that in fairness and good conscience the judgment should uot
be permitted to stand, relief should be grantrlL
However, inasmuch as the plaintiff here seems !11
be relying on the ground of fraud, there is a distinction which it is necessary to point to. In order
to justify granting relief, the alleged wroug •rnnld
have to be of the type characterized as extrinsic
fraud: that is, fraud based on conduct or acfo- ,
ities outside of the court proceedings themselves:
and which is designed and has the effect of depriving the other party of the opportunity to present his claim or defense. This type of fraud,
which is regarded as a fraud not only upon the
opponent, but upon the court itself, can be ac ,
complished in a number of ways, such as making !
false- statements or representations to the other
party or to witnesses to prevent them from contesting the issues; or by that means or othrrwise
preventing the attendance of the parties or witnesses; or by destroying or secreting evidrnce:
so that a fair trial of the issues is effectively pre·
vented.''
The evidence here consists of the type of thing ref errerl
to in the above language. The plaintiff proved by clcnr
and convincing evidence that defendant had taken affir·
mative steps before coming to court to conceal and serrete
the evidence. He trans£ erred and concealed a subs tan
tia1 bank account that was unknown to the plaintiff a11d
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,et np a fraudulent partnership to conceal his income.
These activities were in addition to defendant's perjured testimony regarding his income. Such actions on
the part of defendant were designed and had the effect
,,f <lepriYing plaintiff of the opportunity to litigate the
issL1es in the divorce action, and a fair trial was effecii\'Ply prevented.

A. Tlie Provisions of the Amended Decree Relatin.g to
Alimony and Support u·ere Reasonable
The trial court awarded plaintiff Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month child support and Five HuncheLl Dollars ($500.00) alimony. This amounted to Nine
Hundred Dollars ($900.00) per month or Ten Thousand
~ight Hundred Dollars ($10,800.00) per year.

If the Court believed the statements made by the
clefcndant, .Jack Harrison, to his former attorney that
lie netted just under Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00) in 1967 and expected to double his income in 1968,
theu the above award would be considered very nominal.
If the Court believed that the income from the business for 1967 was Thirty Six Thousand Dollars ($36,000.00) as was testified by the defendant, and further belien'd from the overwhelming evidence that the partnership was a sham and the entire income belonged to the
defendant, still the award would be somewhat modest.

21

If the Court believed the defendant's income to hi·
Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) per year as lit
represented to Valley Bank & Trust Company, and as
appeared on his 1966 tax return, the award would still
be in line with what is reasonable. Especially is this true
where, as here, it was shown that nearly all of the defendant's personal needs are paid for by the com pally.
These include bis automobile, gas and oil, repairs, insurance, rent on apartment, utilities, etc. These benefits
would add the equivalent of several thousand dollar~
per year to the defendant's income.

There is substantial evidence to justify the award
of the trial court. Certainly the plaintiff and the fire
( 5) minor children of the parties are entitled to live in
accordance with the same standard of living as the defendant, particularly where, as here, the guilt for the
break-up of the marriage was found to have rested on
the defendant. See Wilson -vs- Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296
P.2d 977.

B.

The Provision of the Amended Decree Awarding the
Home to Plaintiff was Reasonable

Under the original Decree of Divorce, it was ordered
that the home of the parties be sold and the proceeds
divided between them (R-77). This provision would be
very understandable when considered in light of the findings that the total income of the defendant was Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month. Obviously, if Six Hun·
dred dollars ($600.00) per month had to be divided k
tween two (2) households, the parties simply could not
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haYe afforded to keep the house upon which the mortgage
payments were One Hundred Seventy Dollars ($170.00)
prr mouth. These considerations, however, no longer
L•xist, and there is no reason to remove plaintiff and the
1•hilrlren from their established home.
Plaintiff testified in this action that she had resided
at the home for five and one-half (51/2) years (R-293);
that the children were well established in their respective
schools (R-293) ; that the children are active in church
(R-293); and that the children have many friends in
the neighborhood and participate in Little League Baseball and other neighborhood activities (R-294).
This Court has stated on many occasions that the
primary concern in a divorce action should be the interests of the children. Any divorce between parents causes
t 1J a greater or lesser extent feelings of insecurity on the
part of minor children. It is a difficult adjustment for
tlwm to make. Plaintiff contends that unless it is absolntely necessary, it would be unfair to deprive the chilrlren of the security they receive from their home, their
neighborhood, their school, their church, and their
friends.

It was further made clear by the evidence that defendant has a commercial building in which there is an
r·quity of over Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.()0). '11 his is in addition to the other business assets
of the defendant. Plaintiff has made no claim to any of
tl1ese husiness assets, and it is only equitable and fair
il1at slic· he awarded the home.
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C.

The Provision of the Amended Decree Awardi 11 v
Plaintiff Judgment for One-Half of the Co11cealr1/
Bank Account was Reasonable

The evidence as set forth in the within statement
of facts demonstrated beyond question that the defellllant concealed a bank account in the amount of Nim
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars ($!1,
729.00). It was only fair that plaintiff be awarded one.
half of this amount. This was also in keeping with the
original decree which awarded one-half of the family
savings of Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) to the
plaintiff.

D.

The Provision of the Amended Decree Ordering D('.
fendant to Pa.y to Plaintiff's Former Attorney Any
Additional Fees Earned by Him in the Divorce Case
was Reasonable

During the course of the trial herein, it was brougl1t
to the attention of the Court that plaintiff owed brr
former attorney additional amounts for services reu·
dered in the divorce case (R-145 to 149). The Court or
dered that these amounts be paid by the defendant. It
is true that plaintiff had not petitioned the Court for
this relief. However, in the case of J orgens en -vs- Jorgensen, 17 Utah 2d 159, 406 P.2d 304, this Court rejected
the contention of an appellant that the trial court had
erred where the trial court made an increase in alimony
when the plaintiff had not petitioned for such increase.
The only concern seemed to be the wisdom and propriel)
of the trial court's action.
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In any event, this provision can be of no concern to
the rlefcndant at this time inasmuch as no amount was
fixe1l, an<l the matter was left to be determined in a further hearing. (R-113).

POINT II

THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN A WARDJNG PLAINTIFF A GARNISHEE JUDGMENT
ACL\JNST VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMP ANY

Unrelated to plaintiff's Petition for Modification of
the Dr·erce was a matter concerning an existing garnishment which the Court considered at the trial. The Writ
of Garnishment was served upon Valley Bank & Trust
Company and the Bank answered indicating that is was
indebted to Jack M. Harrison by reason of a checking
account with a balance of Two Thousand One Hundred
Dollars Aud 87/100 ($2,100.87) (R-109). The garnishment was issued against unpaid arrearages and attorney's fees awarded in the original Decree of Divorce.
There was no dispute concerning the amount owing
rn-110, 249), the only question being whether the money
in the checking account belonged to the defendant. As
has been demonstrated herein and discussed at length,
it was clearly shown from the evidence that the alleged
parh1erRhip was nothing more than a fraudulent scheme
to eonceal the assets of the defendant. Section 25-1-25,
l'toh Code Anrnotated, 1953, gives a creditor the right
to disregard a fraudulent conveyance and attach and
lc\y <'xccution upon the property conveyed. The Court
11as correct in awarding a garnishee judgment.
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POINT III
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AW ARD OF
ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THIS AP.
PEAL
The award of attorney's fees.by the trial court coy.
ered only those services rendered to plaintiff at the trial.
Plaintiff seeks that this court in rendering its decision
herein affirmatively order that the trial court award
additional attorney's fees to cover reasonable amounts
incurred by plaintiff in connection with this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case fully supports the judgment of the trial court, and there is nothing in the record
to show any prejudice or abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial judge. The Amended Judgment and Decree was fair and equitable in all respects, and there is
no reason for this Court to interfere with the Decree.
The trial court listened to three days of testimony and
had all of the parties and witnesses before it. There is
no reason to believe that the result would be any different if a new trial were ordered. Respondent respectfully
submits that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS, ARMSTRONG,
RAWLINGS, WEST &
SCHAERRER
David E. \Vest
1300 vValker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plain.tiff and
Respondent
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